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PARTY AUTONOMY IN THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
CONTRACTS: TRANSATLANTIC CONVERGENCE AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
Giesela Rühl* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly acknowledged that during the 20th century 
American and European choice-of-law theory1 have drifted apart: 
In the United States, the American Conflict of Laws Revolution 
ousted the traditional vested rights theory and paved the way for a 
variety of novel approaches focusing on flexibility and fairness in 
individual cases.2 In Europe, in contrast, classical choice-of-law 
theory favoring predictability and legal certainty prevailed.3 The 
20th century, however, has not only seen transatlantic divergence 
in choice of law. In fact, after years of vigorous debates legal 
regimes on either side of the Atlantic have adopted the same 
approach when it comes to the private international law of 
contracts.4 More specifically, both American and European law 
 * Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and 
Private International Law, Hamburg, Germany. 
1 In the common law world the provisions that determine the applicable law are 
usually referred to as choice-of-law rules. In civil law countries, in contrast, the 
provisions dealing with the applicable law are referred to as the rules of private 
international law. In the following article I will use both terms interchangeably. 
See for a discussion of the terminology EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J.
BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1, 1-3 (4th ed. 2004); 
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 3 and 6 (2nd ed. 
2003). 
2 MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE – A GUIDE
THROUGH THE JUNGLE 12, 102-05 (1995). 
3 REIMANN, supra note 2, at 13. 
4 Friedrich K. Juenger, American and European Conflicts Law, 30 AM. J. COMP.
L. 117 (1982); Ole Lando, New American Choice-of-Law Principles and the 
European Conflict of Laws of Contracts, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 19 (1982); Mathias 
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follow the principle of party autonomy and, therefore, allow parties to 
choose the applicable law. 
Of course, the fact that American and European law have moved 
closer over the last years has not escaped the attention of scholars 
around the world.5 However, up until today the precise extent of 
transatlantic convergence6 is essentially unclear. In fact, nobody 
has as yet determined how similar the American and the European 
concepts of party autonomy actually are. And nobody has as yet 
analyzed how similar the handling of the two concepts is in 
practice. In this article I fill this gap by analyzing the design and 
the practical handling of party autonomy in both Europe and the 
United States. I demonstrate that the trend of convergence extends 
beyond basic conceptual similarities and that it reaches business 
reality through the jurisprudence of American and European 
courts (infra II). However, I do not confine the discussion of party 
autonomy to a comparative analysis. I also endeavor to relate the 
comparative insights to the insights of economic theory. More 
specifically, I analyze the concept of party autonomy from an 
economic perspective and venture the hypothesis that the trend of 
                                                                                                                
Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of 
the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 574 et seq. (1999). 
5 See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations: An American Assessment, in CONTRACT 
CONFLICTS – THE E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 295, 299 (Peter North ed., 1982); Reimann, 
supra note 4, at 575-78.  
6 In the following I apply a broad definition of “convergence” that describes the 
general phenomenon of similar solutions in different legal systems irrespective 
of whether they are brought about by conscious interaction or incidental 
parallel development. See Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In 
Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1118 (1999); Ugo Mattei, 
Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 
14 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 3, 6 (1994); UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 126 (1996). See for a comprehensive terminological account JAN 
VON HEIN, DIE REZEPTION US-AMERIKANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS IN 
DEUTSCHLAND § 2 (forthcoming). 
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convergence in the context of party autonomy can be explained 
with the help of economic theory (infra III). 
By exploring issues in the private international law of contract 
from a comparative perspective the article follows the approach 
Arthur von Mehren applied during his entire academic life. 
However, the article also follows von Mehren as far as the 
consideration of economic theory is concerned. This proposition 
probably comes as a surprise for those who have studied von 
Mehren’s work. After all he never joined the Law & Economics 
Movement in the sense that he applied economic theory to legal 
problems himself. However, his own approach to choice of law—
the so-called “functional analysis”7—can be classified as a distant 
relative of an economic approach to choice of law. This is because 
it seeks to identify the policies and purposes underlying legal rules 
and, thus, leaves the confines of doctrinal structures and doctrinal 
arguments. Just like an economic approach to choice of law von 
Mehren’s “functional analysis” is, therefore, characterized by anti-
doctrinalism. And even though important conceptual differences 
remain between his “functional analysis” and an “economic 
analysis” it is this similarity that makes me believe that applying 
economic theory to the choice-of-law problem follows von 
Mehren’s approach to law in general and to choice of law in 
particular. And it is against this background that I hope that this 
article would have appealed to him. 
                                            
7 See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMANN, THE LAW OF 
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); Arthur T. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the 
Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 27 (1977). See also Arthur T. 
von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and 
Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
347 (1974). 
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II. THE TREND OF CONVERGENCE: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
On both sides of the Atlantic the basic tenet of the private 
international law of contracts as it stands today is that parties are 
free to choose the applicable law. In Europe the reign of party 
autonomy is determined by Article 3 (1) Rome Convention8 which 
has been adopted and implemented in all member states of the 
European Union. In the United States the principle of free party 
choice of law flows from Restatement (Second) § 187 and UCC 
§ 1-105.9 However, the supremacy of party autonomy in both the 
United States and Europe is not a matter of course. Rather, it is 
the result of a vigorous debate that lasted for many years and 
ended only some decades ago. 
A. THE SUPREMACY OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the parties’ right to choose 
the applicable law was a highly disputed issue on either side of the 
Atlantic.10 In Europe, where the Italian scholar Pasquale Stanislao 
                                            
8 EC Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (consolidated 
version in 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 et seq.) [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
9 In February 2001, the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State 
Law has adopted a new Article 1 (General Provisions) including a new UCC § 1-
301 that is meant to replace UCC § 1-105. However, so far not all states have 
enacted implementing legislation. And most of the states that have done so did 
not adopt the new UCC § 1-301 but retained UCC § 1-105. Therefore, cross-
border sales within the United States are still for the most part governed by 
state laws corresponding to § 1-105 UCC. For a detailed account of the criticism 
of § 1-301 see Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: 
The Failure of Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 
SETON HALL L. REV. 59 (2005). 
10 See for a more detailed account FRANK VISCHER, INTERNATIONALES 
VERTRAGSRECHT 29-39 (1962); RAINER MAGOLD, DIE PARTEIAUTONOMIE IM 
INTERNATIONALEN UND INTERLOKALEN VERTRAGSRECHT DER VEREINIGTEN 
STAATEN VON AMERIKA 49-84 (1987); ANDRÉ ALOYS WICKI, ZUR 
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Manicini, had laid the foundation for the modern doctrine of party 
autonomy during the 19th century,11 courts were divided in their 
attitudes towards freedom of choice. Whereas judges in England,12 
Germany,13 and France14 generally tended to favor party autonomy, 
courts in other states proved to be more hostile.15 By the same 
token, the European academic community was split. While some 
followed the courts and supported free party choice of law pointing 
to the concept of individual freedom as well as the virtue of legal 
certainty,16 many prominent conflicts scholars did not allow the 
                                                                                                                
DOGMENGESCHICHTE DER PARTEIAUTONOMIE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 
(1965); Hessel E. Yntema, “Autonomy” in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341 
(1952). 
11 See for a detailed account YUKO NISHITANI, MANCINI UND DIE 
PARTEIAUTONOMIE IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (2000). 
12 See, e.g., In re Missouri Steamship Company (1889) 42 Ch.D. 321, 326; 
Spurrier v. La Cloche [1902] A.C. 446, 447; Montgomery v. Zarifi [1918] 2 S.L.T. 
110, 113; Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. 
[1920] 1 K.B. 539, 545.  
13 See, e.g., Reichsgericht [RG] [Imperial Court of Justice], Oct. 3, 1923, 
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 108, 241, 243; RG, Jan 
27, 1928, RGZ 120, 70, 72. 
14 See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], Dec. 5, 1910, 39 Clunet 1156-
1158 (1912).  
15 In Switzerland, for example, up until 1952 courts limited the parties’ freedom 
to choose to the rules governing performance of the contract. They did not 
allow parties to choose the applicable law with regards to the validity of the 
contract. See, e.g., Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [BG] [Supreme Court], June 9, 
1906, Entscheidungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE], BGE 32 II 
415, 417; BG, Dec. 14, 1920, BGE 46 II, 490, 493; BG, June 9, 1936, BGE 62 II, 
125; BG, June 3, 1947, BGE 73 II, 102, 104-105; BG, Feb. 28, 1950, BGE 76 II, 33, 
36. 
16 Neubecker, Das Internationale Privatrecht auf deutschrechtlicher Grundlage, 
JAHRBUCH FÜR DEN INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR [J. INT. RVERK] 8, 81-83 
(1912/13); Ernst Rabel, Rechtsvergleichung und internation ale 
Rechtsprechung, 1 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 5, 41 (1927); Gerhard Mayer, Zur 
Parteiautonomie als Kollisionsnorm, 44 NIEMEYERS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
INTERNATIONALES RECHT [NIEMZ] 103, 121-39 (1931), GEORG MELCHIOR, DIE 
GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 498-531 (1932); 
PAUL LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 218-23, 
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parties to avoid the otherwise applicable law.17 They essentially 
argued that parties could not raise themselves above the law by 
choosing another. In view of increased international trade, 
however, the resistance against the free party choice of law melted 
away in the course of the 20th century. Already in the 1960s, little 
was left of the former opposition to choice-of-law clauses, and the 
parties’ freedom to choose was generally accepted. The final 
victory came in 1980 when the principle of party autonomy was 
incorporated in the Rome Convention.  
In the United States, just like in Europe, party autonomy was the 
focal point of a fierce debate at the beginning of the 20th century. 
And just like in Europe the divide ran more or less between courts 
and scholars: While most American courts and especially the 
Supreme Court recognized a party choice of law,18 many scholars 
were less favorably inclined.19 Notably, Joseph H. Beale, the 
Reporter for the Restatement (First), considered the applicable law 
a matter of state sovereignty and thus beyond the reach of the 
                                                                                                                
368 (1st ed. 1928); P. Kayser, L’autonomie de la volonté en droit international 
privé dans la jurisprudence françaises, 58 CLUNET 32 et seq. (1931); MARCEL 
PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT,TRAITÉ, PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS, VOLUME 
6, 37, 639-44 (1930). 
17 See, e.g., MARCEL CALEB, ESSAI SUR LE PRINCIPLE DE L’AUTONOMIE DE LA 
VOLONTE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1927); ERNST FRANKENSTEIN, 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT, VOLUME II 158 et seq. (1929); HANS LEWALD, 
DAS DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT AUF GRUNDLAGE DER 
RECHTSPRECHUNG 199 et seq. (1931); Jean-Pierre Niboyet, La théorie de 
l’autonomie de la volonté, 16 RECUEIL DES COURS 5-116 (1927 I). 
18 See, e.g., London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreior, 167 U.S. 
149, 17 S.Ct. 785, 790 (1897); Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. 
Tine Cohen, 179 U.S. 262, 21 S.Ct. 106, 109 (1900); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 
144, 22 S.Ct. 52, 54 (1901); Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. 
Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 24 S.Ct. 538, 540 (1904). See also the study of Joseph H. 
Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1909/10). 
19 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 18, at 260-66; RALEIGH C. MINOR, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS; OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1901). 
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parties.20 As a result, the Restatement (First) remained silent on 
the issue, implicitly denying any freedom to choose the applicable 
law.21 However, over the years, the judges’ viewpoint held sway. 
Today, Restatement (Second) § 187 allows for party autonomy 
and—even though not binding by itself—is followed throughout 
the United States. Even states that formally still adhere to the 
Restatement (First)22 or apply various forms of interest analysis 
accept § 187 and the free choice of law as a basic principle of 
contract conflicts.23 As Patrick J. Borchers has pointed out: “… 
courts of all conflicts stripes have flocked to the Second 
Restatement’s broad endorsement of party autonomy in § 187”.24 
Just as well, UCC § 1-105 has been adopted in all of the American 
states. 
After many years of discussion party autonomy, thus, has 
prevailed both in Europe and the United States. It is often termed 
“a universal approach”25 which has also proved to be a success in 
practice: The majority of international contracts provide for a 
choice-of-law clause.26 And by far the most of these clauses are 
                                            
20 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, Volume 2, 1079-80 
(1935). 
21 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
22 In view of the private international law of contracts these states are Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law 
in the American Courts in 2004: Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 
919, 944 (2004). 
23 Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts 
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing 56 MD. L. REV. 1248 (1997). See also Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth Annual 
Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447, 488 (1997). 
24 Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1992: 
Observations and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 135 (1994). 
25 Borchers, supra note 24, at 135. See also Russell J. Weintraub, Functional 
Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES COURS 239, 271 
(1984). 
26 See only the most recent annual reports of Symeon C. Symeonides: Choice of 
Law in the American Courts in 2004, supra note 22, at 967-73; Choice of Law 
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upheld by the courts when disputes arise.27 It is against this 
background, that party autonomy—today—is not seriously called 
into question on either side of the Atlantic. That this is so 
becomes obvious when looking to reform projects in the field: In 
Europe, the Rome Convention is currently under review and will 
soon be replaced by a Community Regulation.28 However, Article 
3 (1) on party autonomy will essentially remain unchanged. By the 
same token, the latest revision of the UCC that has introduced a 
new UCC § 1-301 to replace UCC § 1-10529 does not touch upon 
the parties’ right to choose the applicable law. 
B. THE LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
Beyond the mere fact that party autonomy has emerged as the 
dominant instrument in the private international law of both 
Europe and the United States, the two legal systems have moved 
                                                                                                                
in the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 9, 51-55 (2004); Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth 
Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 55-68 (2003); Choice of Law in the 
American Courts in 2001: Fifteenth Annual Survey, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 21-40 
(2002); Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the Century Turns, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 35-40 (2001); Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
1999: One More Year, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 143, 156-64 (2000); Choice of Law in 
the American Courts in 1998: Twelfth Annual Survey, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 327, 
384-89 (1999); Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1997, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 273-76 (1998); Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
1996, supra note 23, at 488-90; Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1994: 
A View “From the Trenches”, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 54-72 (1995); Choice of Law 
in the American Courts in 1993 (and in the Six Previous Years), 42 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 599, 642-43 (1994). 
27 Ibid. According to a recent study involving 697 American cases, choice-of-law 
clauses are enforced in 85% of the cases. See Larry Ribstein, From Efficiency to 
Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 374-75 (2003). 
28 See the European Commission’s Proposal of the European Parliament and the 
Council for a Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 15 
December 2005, COM(2005) 650 final [hereinafter Proposal for a Rom-I 
Regulation]. 
29 See supra note 9. 
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closer in view of other features as well. Most importantly, both do 
not grant party autonomy unlimited. In fact, both under the Rome 
Convention and under the Restatement (Second) as well as under 
the UCC a number of restrictions on the freedom of choice are in 
place. And even though not all restrictions look the same under 
the respective provisions, a closer analysis proves that their 
application and interpretation over the last years has often led to 
rather similar results in practice.  
1. CONNECTION TO A FOREIGN LAW 
A first limitation to party autonomy that has surfaced on both 
sides of the Atlantic during the 20th century relates to choice-of-
law clauses in purely domestic cases: According to Article 3 (3) 
Rome Convention a choice of a foreign law, whether or not 
accompanied by the choice of a foreign tribunal, does not, where 
all other elements relevant to the contract at the time of the 
choice are connected with one country only, prejudice the 
application of the mandatory laws of that country. In purely 
domestic cases a choice-of-law clause, therefore, will not be 
enforced in view of the mandatory provisions of the law which 
would be applicable had the parties not agreed on a foreign law. 
The Restatement (Second) and the UCC do not contain an express 
provision that corresponds to Article 3 (3) Rome Convention. This, 
however, does not mean that the parties may derogate from the 
mandatory provisions of the law otherwise applicable even if there 
is no connection to a foreign state: The commentary to 
Restatement (Second) § 187 states that the provision does only 
apply “when two or more states have an interest in the 
determination of the particular issue”.30 Therefore, it is not 
applicable “when all contacts are located in a single state and 
when, as a consequence, there is only one interested state”.31 That 
this statement has not only theoretical but also practical meaning 
becomes obvious when looking at the cases rendered under 
                                            
30 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. d). 
31 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. d). 
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Restatement (Second) § 187 as well as under UCC § 1-105 (1): All 
cases decided under any of the two provisions during the last 
couple of years touch upon the legal systems of at least two 
states.32 
However, more relevant than the mere fact that both American 
and European law restrict the free party choice of law in purely 
domestic cases is the question what exactly is considered to be a 
domestic case under both legal regimes. In other words: What 
amounts to a sufficient relationship to a foreign law? Which 
elements turn a domestic case into an international case? A look 
at the relevant case law shows that courts in both Europe and the 
United States do not require much in order to assume a 
connection to a foreign country. It is usually regarded as sufficient 
if one of the parties is habitually resident abroad, if one of the 
parties is incorporated abroad, if one of the parties has her 
principle of business abroad, if the contract was entered abroad, or 
if performance is to take place abroad.33 This holds true even if all 
but one element are connected with one country only.34 As a 
result, it is fair to say that both American and European law do not 
only require a sufficient relationship to a foreign law but also find 
such a relationship in essentially the same cases. However, it is 
also fair to say that the threshold for finding a sufficient 
relationship is rather low on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, 
                                            
32 See the cases cited in SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, 
§ 18, at 946-87. 
33 See, for Article 3 (3) of the Rome Convention Dieter Martiny, Deutsches 
Internationales Privatrecht, in INTERNATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT 59, 71-72, no. 
62 (Christoph Reithmann & Dieter Martiny eds., 6th ed. 2004). See for 
Restatement (Second) 187 and UCC § 1-105 the cases cited in SCOLES, HAY, 
BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, § 18, at 946-87. 
34 See RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS 
CONVENTION no. 5-24, 105 (2001) and F.M.B. Reynolds, Vita Food Resurgent, 
108 L.Q.R. 395 (1992). Both refer to the case of Svolmar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
Hellenic Steel Co. („The Komnino S“) [1991] Llyod’s Rep. 370 which, however, 
was decided under the English common law rules.  
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the limitation relating to purely domestic cases does not amount 
to a major obstacle to a free choice of law in practice.35 
2. SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHOSEN LAW 
In addition to limiting the free party choice of law in purely 
domestic cases, American law imposes further restrictions on 
party autonomy where the choice of law touches upon the 
mandatory provisions of the law otherwise applicable to the 
transaction: According to Restatement (Second) § 187 (2) (a) and 
UCC § 1-105 (1) the law of the state chosen by the parties will 
only be applied if the chosen state has a substantial relationship to 
the parties or the transaction. A choice-of-law clause, thus, will 
not be enforced against the mandatory provisions of the law 
otherwise applicable if there is a lack of a substantial relationship 
between the contract and the chosen law. The Rome Convention, 
in contrast, does not require a substantial or other relationship to 
the chosen law.36 As long as the contract is connected with more 
than one country in the meaning of Article 3 (3) a choice-of-law 
clause will be enforced.37 The Rome Convention, therefore, 
                                            
35 Note, however, the case of Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Systems, Inc. 868 P.2d 
809 (Utah 1993), in which the Supreme Court of Utah – wrongfully – limited 
the analysis to the question whether there was a connection to more than one 
American state thereby neglecting that the Restatement (Second) applies to 
national and international cases. 
36 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 34, no. 5-25, at 105-106. 
37 See, for example, the infamous German Gran Canaria Timeshare cases in 
which the plaintiffs were German nationals and resident in Germany who had, 
while on holiday in Spain, signed onerous timeshare contracts relating to 
property situated in Spain. The choice-of-law clause in these contracts provided 
for application of the law of the Isle of Man which had a connection to the 
transaction only insofar as the Time Share sellers were companies registered in 
the Isle of Man. This connection, however, was rather weak since the contracts 
were to be performed the Time Share sellers’ German subsidiaries. See 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 19, 1997, DIE 
DEUTSCHE RECHTSPRECHUNG AUF DEM GEBIET DES INTERNATIONALEN 
PRIVATRECHTS [IPRSPR.] 1997, no.34. 
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imposes less strict requirements for the enforcement of choice-of-
law clauses than the Restatement (Second) as well as the UCC.38 
In practice, however, the differences between the two conflicts 
regimes have turned out to be minor during the last years. Several 
factors are responsible for this finding: First of all, under 
Restatement (Second) § 187 (2) (a) the absence of a substantial 
relationship to the chosen law can be cured by the presence of 
another reasonable basis for the parties’ choice. A reasonable basis 
in this sense exists, for example, where the parties conclude and 
perform the contract in countries whose law is or whose law is 
relatively undeveloped.39 But there are other situations in which 
the parties have good reasons to provide for application of a foreign 
law. In fact, there are few situations in which the parties do not 
have a good reason for a choice of law.40 As the commentary to 
Restatement (Second) § 187 (2) (a) points out: Parties enter into 
contracts for serious purposes and usually do not provide for 
choice-of-law clause “in the spirit of adventure” or to provide 
“mental exercise for the judge”.41 Second, and more importantly, 
courts in the United States have lowered the requirements that 
need to be met in order to find a substantial relationship to the 
chosen law. Today, a sufficient substantial relationship is, for 
example, assumed when the parties choose the law of the state 
                                            
38 See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts 
Law 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 421, 434 (1995); Reimann, supra note 4, at 578.  
39 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. f). 
40 As one commentator has noted: “It is not clear why any choice the parties 
mutually agree to is not prima facie ‘reasonable’.” See Larry E. Ribstein, 
Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 264 (1993). 
41 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. f). See, e.g., Radioactive, J.V. v. Manson, 153 
F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y: 2001). The case revolved around a music recording 
contract containing a New York choice-of-law clause. The court noted that 
New York had sufficient contracts with the contract. However, it also held that 
even in the absence of such contacts, the choice of New York law would have 
been reasonable: “New York federal and state courts have significant experience 
with music industry contracts, and the parties wanted to avail themselves of 
that experience by selecting a New York forum and New York law.” Id. at 471. 
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where the contract was made,42 where performance of the contract 
is to take place,43 where one of the parties is domiciled,44 where 
one of the parties is incorporated,45 or where one of the parties has 
her principal place of business.46 However, any other relationship 
to a foreign state, however small, will also suffice. In Evans v. 
Harry Robinson Pontiac-Buick, Inc.,47 for example, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas upheld a choice of Texas law relating to a retail 
installment agreement entered into in Arkansas between an 
Arkansas buyer and an Arkansas car dealer on the face that the 
contract had been assigned to a Texas finance company. The court 
found that this assignment in combination with the buyer’s 
knowledge of it established a sufficient relationship with Texas so 
as to justify the application of Texas law to the retail installment 
agreement.48 Just as well, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
                                            
42 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. f). 
43 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. f). 
44 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. f). See, e.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l 
Inc. 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Ventra Group, Inc. 191 F.3d 732 (6th 
Cir, 1999); International Business Machines Corporation v. Bajorek 191 F.3d 
1033 (9th Cir. 1999). 
45 See, e.g., Ciena Corporation v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2000); Dopp 
v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, 1993 WL 404076 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993); Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court 3 Cal.4th 459, 467 (1992). But see 
Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing the 
enforcement of a Delaware choice-of-law clause for lack of a substantial 
relationship with that state even though one of the parties was incorporated in 
Delaware); Triad Fin. Establishment v. Tumpane, 611 F.Supp 157, 163-164 
(1985) (refusing the enforcement a New York choice-of-law clause in a 
marketing agreement between a Liechtenstein company and a New York 
corporation with main office in Washington and only two employees in New 
York). 
46 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. f). See, e.g., A.G. Edwards & Sons. Inc. v. 
Smith 736 F.Supp. 1030, 1036 (D.Ariz. 1989); Long v. Holland American Law 
Westours, Inc. 26 P.3d 430 (Alaska 2001). 
47 336 Ark. 155, 983 S.W.2d 946 (1999). 
48 See also the pre-Restatement case Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pakistan, 
307 F.Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding a choice of English law in a contract 
for the shipping of goods from Pakistan to the United States on a Greek vessel 
without further discussion). 
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upheld a Massachusetts choice of law in Hodas v. Morin.49 The 
case revolved around a contract for surrogate motherhood between 
a Connecticut couple and a New York woman. According to the 
gestational carrier agreement all steps necessary to carry out the 
contract, including implantation and prenatal care were to take 
place in Connecticut. Yet, when the genetic parents brought an 
action for pre-birth judgments of parentage and for issuance of a 
pre-birth record of birth the court upheld the Massachusetts 
choice of law. It argued that Massachusetts had a substantial 
relationship to the transaction because the contract envisaged 
delivery of the child in a hospital in Massachusetts. 
Against this background, it seems that American courts consider 
almost any relationship to the foreign law as a substantial 
relationship in the meaning of § 187 (2) (a) Restatement and thus 
reduce the number of cases in which a choice-of-law clause will 
not be enforced against the mandatory provisions of the law 
otherwise applicable. Actually, during the last years in the United 
States only few choice-of-law clauses relating to a contract have 
not been enforced for lack of a substantial relationship under 
Restatement (Second) § 187 (2) (a) or UCC § 1-105.50 Compared to 
the number of cases in which the courts have upheld choice-of-law 
clauses despite partly negligible contacts to the chosen law, the 
number of cases invalidating choice-of-law clauses for insufficient 
                                            
49 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004). 
50 Sentinel Industrial Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Industrial Service Corp., 
743 S.2d 954 (Miss. 1999) (refusing the enforcement of a Texas choice-of-law in 
a contract that provided for the dismantlement of an Exxon ammonia plant 
located in Mississippi and for its shipment and reassembly in Pakistan); United 
Countries Trust Company v. Mac Lum, Inc, 643 F. 2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(refusing the enforcement of a New York choice of law in a sale-and-lease-back 
contract between a Kentucky and a New Jersey corporation concerning 
restaurant fixtures and equipment located in Georgia). See also Curtis 1000, Inc. 
v. Suess, supra note 45; Triad Fin. Establishment v. Tumpane, supra note 45; 
CCR Data Systems, Inc. v. Panasonic Communications & Systems Company, 
1995 WL 54380 (D.N.H., 1995); LaGuardia Associates v. Holiday Hospitality 
Franchising, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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relationship to the chosen law is so small that they must be 
deemed exceptions.51 They certainly cannot impair the general 
impression that the substantial relationship requirement 
embodied in Restatement (Second) § 187 (2) (b) and UCC § 1-105 
does not play a significant role in practice and that, as a result 
thereof, the United States are moving closer to Europe. 
That American and European law are moving closer becomes also 
obvious when looking at recent legislative developments in the 
field: To begin with, several American states have eased the choice 
of an unrelated law. Oregon and Louisiana, for example, have 
enacted legislation that does not require any connection to the 
chosen law.52 Additionally, Texas has enacted a provision that 
allows a choice of law for transactions involving not less than U.S. 
$ 1,000,000.00 regardless of whether the transaction bears a 
reasonable relation to that jurisdiction.53 By the same token, 
California, Illinois and New York allow for a free choice of their 
own law without any further requirements as long as the 
transaction in question covers in the aggregate not less than U.S. 
$ 250,000.00.54 However, more important than these developments 
on the state level is that the substantial relationship requirement 
has recently been abandoned by both the new UCC § 1-301 and 
UCITA § 109 (a).55 If both acts are implemented by the American 
                                            
51 See also William J. Woodward, Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice 
in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 716 (2001). 
52 Louisiana Civil Code Art. 3540; Oregon Revised Statutes § 81.120. 
53 Texas Business & Commerce Code § 35.51 (c). See for a detailed discussion 
Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in 
Commercial Arbitration, 79 St. John’s L. Rev. 59, 82-89 (2005); Edith Friedler, 
Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 
36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 471 (1989). 
54 New York General Obligations Law § 5-1401; 735 Illinois Compiled Statute 
105/5-5; California Civil Code § 1646.5.  
55 However, according to the new UCC § 1-301 (e) (1) a reasonable relation is 
required if one of the parties is a consumer. 
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states56 they will further the apparent convergence of European and 
American law. 
3. CHOICE OF STATE LAW 
The third limitation that has emerged in both the United States 
and Europe relates to the subject matter of choice-of-law clauses: 
While both legal systems allow the parties to choose the law of a 
state, they do not recognize the choice of general principles of law 
or non-state codifications. In Europe, this finding flows from the 
wording of the Rome Convention which leaves no doubt that its 
conflicts rules only refer to state laws.57 Article 1 (1) expressly 
stipulates that the Convention governs the “choice between the 
laws of different countries”. Furthermore, all other provisions, 
especially those dealing with contracts, such as Article 3 (3) and 7 
(1) refer to the applicable law as “the law of a country”. In the 
United States, in contrast, the situation is not as clear. In fact, the 
issue is not even very much discussed.58 However, the most 
important provisions in the field, namely Restatement (Second) § 
187, UCC § 1-105 and the new UCC § 1-301, designate the law to 
which reference is made as the “law of a state”. And since “state” 
is defined in Restatement (Second) § 3 as “territorial unit with a 
                                            
56 So far the UCITA has been implemented by two states, Maryland and 
Virginia. More states are bound to follow. The new UCC § 1-301, in contrast, 
has not yet been adopted on a large scale. Most states that have implemented 
the revised version of Article 1 have retained UCC § 1-105. See, e.g., Alabama 
Code § 7-1-301; Arkansas Code Ann. § 4-1-301; Minnesota Statutes Ann. 
§ 336,1.301; Virginia Code Ann. § 8.1A-301 (b), and supra note 9.  
57 LAWRENCE COLLINS et al., DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS no. 
32-079, 1223 (13th ed. 2000); Paul Lagarde, Le nouveau droit international privé 
des contrats après l’entrée en vigeur de la convention de Rome du 19 juin 1980, 
80 REV. CRIT. DR. INTERNAT. PRIVÉ 287, 300-01 (1991); Ulrich Drobnig, The 
UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws, UNIFORM LAW REVIEW 385, 388 
(1998); Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation, 62 RABELSZ 
580, 593-94 (1998); PETER NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH’S 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 559-60 (13th ed. 1999). 
58 See only Symeon C. Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54 
AM. J. COMP. L. 209 (2006). 
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distinct body of law” this wording suggests that only the 
application—and the choice—of state law is contemplated. Case 
law supports this finding: In Trans Meridian Trading Inc. v. 
Empresa Nacional de Comerzialicion de Insumos, for example, 
the Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit refused to enjoin payment 
on an international letter of credit despite the fact that the 
contract had been expressly made “subject to the Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credit (1983 Revision) 
International Chamber of Commerce (Publication no. 400)” (UCP) 
which allowed issuance of an injunction under the given 
circumstances. The court argued that the UCP was not the law “of 
a foreign jurisdiction, but rather … a compendium of commercial 
practices published by the International Chamber of Commerce”. 
Therefore, “a provision in a letter of credit that the UCP governs 
the transaction” did not “prevent application of California’s 
Commercial Code”.59 
Against this background, it is fair to say that—at least in 
practice—not only European but also American law excludes the 
choice of a non-state body of law. However, despite this finding 
two remarks are in order: First, the fact that a choice of non-state 
rules is not allowed under both legal systems does not mean that 
such a choice is ignored all together.60 To the contrary: In both 
Europe and the United States a choice of non-state rules is given 
effect with the help of the doctrine of incorporation, which allows 
the parties, in the exercise and within the limits of freedom of 
contract, to incorporate such rules as terms of the contract.61 The 
comment to Restatement (Second) § 187 expressly notes: “The 
                                            
59 829 F.2d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1987) confirming Pubali Bank v. City National 
Bank et al. 777 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985). See also P. John Kozyris, Choice 
of Law in the American Courts in 1987: An Overview, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 547, 
561 (1988).  
60 See also Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, 
Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1209, 1231-33 (2005); Symeonides, supra note 58, at 215-21. 
61 Drobnig, supra note 57, at 386; Lagarde, supra note 57, at 300-01; Michaels, 
supra note 57, at 595-96; Symeonides, supra note 58, at 216-17 (2006). 
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parties, generally speaking, have power to determine the terms of 
their contractual engagement. They may spell out these terms in 
the contract. In the alternative, they may incorporate into the 
contract by reference extrinsic material which, among other 
things, may be the provisions of some foreign law.”62 The 
reporter’s note to the Restatement (Second) § 187 adds “that the 
parties may also stipulate for the application of trade association 
rules or well known commercial customs.”63 And the comment to 
the new UCC § 1-302 emphasizes that the parties may depart from 
the variable provisions of the UCC “by stating that their 
relationship will be governed by recognized bodies of rules or 
principles applicable to commercial transactions”.64 As examples 
for such bodies of rules or principles the comment refers to “those 
that are promulgated by intergovernmental authorities such as 
UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT (see, e.g., Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts), or non-legal codes such as 
trade codes”.65 
                                            
62 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. c). By the same token, comment 1 to UCC 
§ 1-105 provides that “an agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take 
effect as shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters governed 
by their agreement.” 
63 Restatement (Second) § 187, Reporter’s Note to subsection 1 quoting London 
Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens, 167 U.S. 149 (1887) (dealing with average 
adjustment according to usages of Lloyds); Boole v. Union Marine Insurance 
Company, 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (1921) (dealing with adjustment of 
loss according to English law and customs). 
64 UCC § 1-302, cmt. 2 (2001 Revision). 
65 UCC § 1-302, cmt. 2 (2001 Revision). This general principle is reiterated in 
other parts of the UCC such as Article 5 which regulates letters of credit. 
According to the new version of UCC § 5-116 (c) parties are expressly allowed 
to make a letter of credit subject to any rules of custom or practice such as the 
UCP. If the parties avail themselves of this option “those rules will govern” 
except to the extent of any conflict with the non-variable provisions of the 
UCC. Since § 5-116 UCC has been adopted by all American states with the 
exception of Wisconsin the Trans Meridian Trading case came out differently 
today. It would have come out differently even back then if the law of New 
York had been applicable: according to N.Y. UCC § 5-102 (4) former Article 5 
UCC did not apply if any portion of a letter of credit was subject to the UCP. In 
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Second, even though European and American law do not honor a 
choice of a non-state body of law at present it seems that attitudes 
on both sides of the Atlantic are in the process of changing: To 
begin with, two American states, Oregon and Louisiana, have 
recently adopted choice-of-law statutes that effectively abandon 
any limitation in this context. More specifically they have enacted 
provisions that expressly allow the parties to choose the governing 
“law” rather than the “law of a state”.66 That this is meant to 
broaden the parties’ choice as compared to the Restatement 
(Second) or the UCC becomes obvious when looking to the official 
comments to the Oregon codification: There, it is emphasized that 
“parties to an international contract may choose to have it 
governed by the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts.”67 But not only in the United States the resistance 
towards the choice of non-state laws seems to melt away: In 
Europe, Article 3 (2) of the recently submitted Proposal for a Rom-I 
Regulation68 provides that the parties shall be allowed to „choose 
as the applicable law the principles and rules recognised 
internationally or in the Community“. According to the 
accompanying explanatory memorandum, this wording is meant 
to “authorise the choice of the UNIDROIT Principles, the 
European Principles of Contract Law or a possible future 
Community instrument, while excluding the lex mercatoria, 
which is not precise enough, or private codifications not 
                                                                                                                
the meanwhile New York has adopted § 5-116 (c) UCC without any non-
uniform amendments. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.), § 5-116, 
no. 181-83 (2002); Dellas W. Lee, Letters of Credit: What does Revised Article 5 
have to offer to Issuers, Applicants, and Beneficiaries? 101 COM. L. J. 234, 239-
41 (1996). 
66 Louisiana Civil Code Art. 3540; Oregon Revised Statutes § 81.120. See for a 
detailed discussion of the Oregon statute, James A. R. Nafziger, Oregon's 
Conflicts Law Applicable to Contracts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397-413 (2002); 
Symeon C. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Oregon 
Experience, 67 RABELSZ 726-47 (2003). 
67 Oregon Revised Statute § 81.120, cmt. 3 printed in 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 419 
(2002). 
68 See supra note 28. 
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adequately recognized by the international community“.69 It, 
therefore, seems that both in the United States and Europe the 
view that parties should be allowed to choose a non-state body of 
law is gaining ground. 
4. PRIORITY OF PROTECTIVE LAWS 
Next to the aforementioned limitations of party autonomy which 
impose requirements for the validity and enforceability of a free 
party choice of law, both American and European law restrict 
choice-of-law clauses when it comes to certain contracts. These 
restrictions usually refer to contracts in which one party is 
perceived to be systematically in a weaker position, most 
importantly consumer contracts, employment contracts and 
insurance contracts.70 However, whereas in Europe these 
limitations are expressly laid down in the Rome Convention or—
in the case of insurance contracts—in other Community acts, 
courts in the United States had to develop the applicable 
principles over a period of several years on a case-by-case basis. 
i. Consumer Contracts 
The most important transactions for which both American and 
European law significantly curtail the possibility of a free party 
choice of law are consumer transactions, i.e. transactions in which 
one party is a natural person acting outside his trade or profession. 
In Europe, Article 5 (2) Rome Convention provides that a choice-
of-law clause in such contracts must not deprive the consumer of 
                                            
69 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 28, at 5. 
70 Additionally, in the United States choice-of-law clauses are given limited 
effect in franchise contracts. See, e.g., Twin Cities Galleries, LLC v. Media Arts 
Group, Inc., 2006 WL 334908 (D. Minn.); Modern Computer Systems, Inc. v. 
Modern Banking Systems, Inc., 858 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1988); Wright-Moore 
Corporation v. Ricoh Corporation, 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990); Tele-Save 
Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distributing Company, Ltd., 814 F.2d 1120 
(6th Cir. 1987). See also SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, 
§ 18.5, at 966-974. 
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the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law 
of the country in which he has his habitual residence if the 
contract has been concluded under certain circumstances.71 As a 
result, a choice of law cannot strip the consumer of the coverage of 
the consumer protection laws of his habitual residence. Instead, he 
may rely on the mandatory rules of his habitual residence and, 
thus, invoke the law whichever is the more favorable to him.72 
In the United States, in contrast, the effect of choice-of-law 
clauses in consumer contracts is not expressly limited. Neither 
the Restatement (Second) nor the UCC contain any provision to 
this extent. Nonetheless, over the years American courts have 
found a means to protect consumers against choice-of-law clauses: 
the fundamental public policy doctrine laid down in Restatement 
(Second) § 187 (2) (b).73 According to this doctrine a choice-of-law 
clause is not effective to the extent that application of the law of 
the state or country designated would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of the state or country which has a materially 
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the 
particular issue and which, under § 188, would be the state of the 
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the 
                                            
71 More specifically, Article 5 (2) applies (i) if in the country of the consumer’s 
habitual residence the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific 
invitation addressed to the consumer or by advertising, and the consumer took 
all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract in that 
country, or (ii) if the other party or his agent received the consumer’s order in 
that country, or (iii) if the consumer travelled from that country to another 
country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer’s journey was 
arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy. 
72 C.G.J. Morse, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations 2 YBK. E.L. 107, 136-137 (1982); PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 
34, no. 7-21, at 140. 
73 UCC § 1-105 (1) does not contain an express fundamental policy exemption. 
However, it has been held that the public policy limitation has to be read into 
the provision. See Mell v. Goodbody & Co., 295 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ill. App. 1973). 
See SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, § 18.12, at 985-986; 
Röhm & Koch, Choice of Law in International Distribution Contracts: 
Obstacle or Opportunity, 11 N.Y. INT’L L. Rev. 1, 7 (1998). 
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parties.74 Of course, the concept of fundamental public policy is 
highly indeterminate. The commentary to Restatement (Second) § 
187 (2) (b) even acknowledges that “no detailed statement can be 
made of the situations where a ‘fundamental’ policy of the state of 
the otherwise applicable law will be found to exist”. However, it 
points out that a fundamental policy “may be embodied in a 
statute ... which is designed to protect a person against the 
oppressive use of superior bargaining power”.75 Since consumer 
contracts are regarded as one of the prime examples for contracts 
in which the parties are in unequal bargaining positions, American 
courts tend to invalidate choice-of-law clauses in consumer 
contracts for violation of public policy. More specifically, they 
tend to invalidate choice-of-law clauses in consumer contracts 
that call for application of a law other than the law of the 
consumer’s habitual residence the main argument being that this 
would be the law otherwise applicable under § 188 Restatement 
(Second).76 They do so especially in cases where the consumer 
protection schemes of the law of the consumer’s habitual 
residence either exclude any choice of law77 or prohibit any express 
or implied waiver.78 In America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court,79 
for example, the court did not enforce a Virginia choice-of-law 
                                            
74 A noteworthy statutory exception to the public policy doctrine is housed in 
the Texas Business & Commerce Code: According to § 35.51 (b) a choice of law 
clauses will be enforced even where that choice contravenes a fundamental 
public policy of another state. 
75 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. g). See for a detailed discussion of this 
interpretation of the public policy exception Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. 
Consumers Distributor Corporation, 814 F.2d 1120, 1123 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Wallace Hardware Company, Inc. v. Abrams 223 F.3d 382, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) 
76 There are also cases that invalidate a choice-of-law clause in consumer 
contracts for violation of a fundamental public policy of a third country. See, 
e.g., Long v. Holland American Law Westours, Inc. 26 P.3d 430 (Alaska 2001). 
77 Express exclusions are to be found, for example, in Louisiana and Oregon. See 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 51:1418 C (1); Oregon Revised Statutes § 81.105. 
78 See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Ca. Rptr.2d 699 (Calif. 
App. 2001); Stone Street Services, Inc. v. Daniels, 2000 WL 1909373 (E.D.Pa. 
2000). 
79 108 Ca. Rptr.2d 699 (Calif. App. 2001). 
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clause in a contract for internet services between America Online 
and California consumers because California had a consumer 
protection statute providing that any waiver of the consumer’s 
rights under the statute was void as contrary to California public 
policy. The consumers filed a class action against America Online 
charging that the defendant continued to debit their credit cards 
after the consumers terminated their subscription. The court held 
that enforcement of the choice-of-law clause would be the 
functional equivalent of a contractual waiver of the consumer 
protection provisions of the California statute and held the clause 
unenforceable.80 Just as well, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
refused to enforce a Pennsylvania choice-of-law clause in Stone 
Street Services, Inc. v. Daniels.81 The case revolved around an 
annuity agreement sold by a Pennsylvania corporation to a Kansas 
consumer who had suffered mental injury as a result of an 
accident. A Kansas statute prohibited a party from “tak[ing] 
advantage of the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect 
the consumer’s interest because of the consumer’s physical 
infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the 
language of the agreement or similar fact”.82 Additionally, the 
statute prohibited waiver of its provisions. The court held that 
Pennsylvania law should not be applied because it would violate 
Kansas fundamental policy embodied in the statute.  
As a result of the American case law, consumers in the United 
States are usually afforded the protection of the law of the habitual 
residence and thus the same protection as in Europe. Differences 
seem to remain only insofar as the public policy doctrine of the 
Restatement (Second) invalidates a choice of law altogether 
whereas Article 5 of the Rome Convention allows a choice of law 
but calls for application of the law of the consumer’s habitual 
residence to the extent that it is more favorable than the chosen 
                                            
80 See also Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 906, 103 
Cal.Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071 (Cal. 2001). 
81 2000 WL 1909373 (E.D.Pa. 2000). 
82 Kansas Statutes § 50-627 (b) (1). 
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law. Read literally Article 5, thus, calls for application of a law 
mix based on a comparison of the substantive results attained 
under the law chosen by the parties on the one hand and the law 
of the consumer’s habitual residence on the other.83 A closer look, 
however, reveals that the workings of the two concepts in practice 
is actually very similar: On the one hand, in Europe courts hardly 
ever engage in the comparison of the chosen law and the law of 
the consumer’s habitual residence required by Article 5. Instead, 
they either consider the mandatory provisions of the consumer’s 
country as being applicable in spite of the parties’ choice of a 
foreign law or apply the law of the habitual residence to the entire 
contract.84 On the other hand, under the American fundamental 
public policy doctrine the choice-of-law clause is only invalid if it 
goes against a state’s fundamental public policy. This is only the 
case if the chosen law affords less protection to the consumer than 
that state’s law. If it affords greater protection there is no violation 
of public policy and the choice-of-law clause will be enforced. Just 
like under the Rome Convention it is, therefore, the law more 
favorable to the consumer that will usually prevail.  
The finding of transatlantic convergence is also supported by 
                                            
83 Jürgen Basedow, Internationales Verbrauchervertragsrecht – Erfahrungen, 
Prinzipien und Europäische Reform, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERIK JAYME, VOLUME I 
3, 15-16 (Heinz-Peter Mansel et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Basedow, 
Internationales Verbrauchervertragsrecht]; Jürgen Basedow, Consumer 
Contracts and Insurance Contracts in a Future Rom-I Regulation, in 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
COVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BRUSSELS I AND ROME I 269, 279-280 (J. 
Meeusen et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Basedow, Consumer Contracts and 
Insurance Contracts in a Future Rom-I Regulation]; DICEY & MORRIS, supra 
note 57, no. 33-016, at 1289-1290; Dieter Martiny, Verbraucherverträge, in 
INTERNATIONALES VERTRAGSRECHT, supra note 33, no. 826, at 684-685. 
84 See, e.g., BGH, Oct. 26, 1993, IPRSPR. 1993, no. 37, 97; Tribunal d’instance 
Niort, July 1, 1998, CONTRATS, CONCURRENCE, CONSOMMATION 18, no. 137 
(1998). See for a detailed account Basedow, Internationales 
Verbrauchervertragsrecht, supra note 83, at 16-17; Basedow, Consumer 
Contracts and Insurance Contracts in a Future Rom-I Regulation, supra note 
83, at 279-82. 
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recent legislative enactments: Both the Louisiana and the new 
Oregon choice of law code provide for application of the law at the 
consumer’s habitual residence if his assent to the contract was 
obtained in that state, or if he was induced to enter into the 
contract for example by an invitation or advertisement in that 
state.85 Additionally, both the new UCC as well as the UCITA 
contain special rules for consumer contracts that provide for 
application of the law most favorable to the consumer: According 
to the new UCC § 1-301 (e) (2) a free choice of law may not deprive 
the consumer of the protection of any mandatory rule of law of the 
state or the country in which he principally resides or—if the 
transaction is a sale of goods—of the state or country in which he 
both made the contract and took delivery of those goods, if such 
state or country is not the state or country in which he principally 
resides. By the same token, UCITA § 109 (a) provides that a choice 
of law is not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it 
would vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement under the 
law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply in the absence of 
the agreement. Since both provisions are clearly modeled after 
Article 5 of the Rome Convention,86 they prove, again, that 
American and European law are moving closer.87 
                                            
85 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 51:1418 B and C (1); Oregon Revised Statutes 
§ 81.105 (4). 
86 See for the implementing status of the two acts supra note 56. 
87 It needs to be mentioned, however, that Article 5 (1) which served as a model for 
UCC § 1-301 and UCITA § 109 is currently under discussion. More specifically, 
Article 5 (1) of the Proposal for a Rom I-Regulation excludes any choice of law 
in consumer contracts and calls for application of the law of the consumer’s 
habitual residence. It, thus, abandons the very approach that has just been 
adopted in the United States. However, the draft provision is highly disputed so 
that – as of 2006 – it is unclear whether it will finally be enacted. Even if it is 
enacted it is unclear whether it will lead to substantial change in practice: First, 
it has been mentioned earlier, that European courts under the current regime do 
not engage in a comparison of substantive laws but tend to apply the law of the 
consumer’s habitual residence to the entire contract. Second, even if a choice of 
law is completely excluded in consumer contracts terms of a foreign law may 
still be incorporated by reference. Since incorporation operates within the limits 
26 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 01 
 
 
ii. Employment Contracts 
Next to consumer contracts the Rome Convention also grants 
special protection to employees: According to Article 6 (1) a choice 
of law clause in an employment contract must not deprive the 
employee of the protection of the mandatory rules of law which 
would be applicable in the absence of a choice of law,88 i.e. the law 
of the country where the employee habitually carries out his work. 
A choice-of-law clause in an employment contract, therefore, 
cannot strip the employee of the protective laws at the place of his 
employment. The employee may always rely on the mandatory 
rules of this place and thereby on the law whichever is the more 
favorable to him. 
The Restatement (Second) and the UCC, in contrast, do not 
provide for any rules designed to protect employees against a 
choice of law. But does that mean that the parties are really free to 
choose the applicable law in the United States? At first sight, the 
answer seems to be yes. There it a great number of cases in which 
choice-of-law clauses were actually upheld. A closer look, 
however, reveals that most of these cases revolved around choice-
of-law clauses that called for application of the place of 
employment.89 Cases enforcing choice-of-law clauses calling for 
application of a law other than this place are few and—most 
                                                                                                                
of the freedom of contract the difference between the current and the possible 
future Article 5 are minor.  
88 The Proposal for a Rome I- Regulation will not bring about any changes in 
this respect: Article 6 (1) of the Proposal is identical to Article 6 (1) of the Rome 
Convention.  
89 See, e.g., Pirkey v. Hospital Corporation of America, 483 F.Supp. 770,772-773 
(D. Col. 1980); Upshaw v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 
85 F.R.D. 674, 676 (E.D. Arkansas 1980); Penn-Dixi Industries, Inc. v. Penn-
Dixie Steel Corporation 22 B.R. 794, 797 (Bky.S.D.N.Y. 1982). Burbank v. Ford 
Motor Company, 703 F.2d 865, 866-867 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Parets v. Eaton 
Corporation, 479 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (upholding a Michigan choice of 
law clause on the basis that Michigan was the envisioned place of employment 
after completion of an assignment abroad). 
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importantly—date back to the 1970s.90 Recent cases, in contrast, 
indicate that American courts tend to invalidate choice-of law 
clauses in employment contracts under the fundamental public 
policy exception entailed in Restatement (Second) § 187 (2) (b).91 
More specifically, American courts tend to invalidate choice-of-
law clauses that call for application of a law other than the law of 
the place of employment the main argument being that this would 
usually be the law otherwise applicable under Restatement 
(Second) § 188.92 Especially when it comes to non-competition 
agreements American courts almost always ignore a choice of law 
if the chosen law violates the employment protection laws of the 
state where the employee had to perform the contract.93 But the 
domain of the fundamental public policy doctrine extends beyond 
non-competition agreements.94 In fact, it covers almost all 
contractual rights and duties arising out of employment contracts. 
In the recent case Wright v. Martek Power, Inc.,95 for example, an 
                                            
90 See, e.g., Matthews v. Swift and Company, 465 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1972); Craig 
v. Bemis Company, Inc. (5th Cir. 1975); Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corporation, 
437 F.2d 527 (3rd Cir. 1970). 
91 See also Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004, supra 
note 22, at 970: “Because of the likely unequal bargaining power of the parties, 
choice-of-law clauses in employment contracts usually encounter strict and 
often fatal judicial scrutiny.” 
92 See for cases that applied the law at the place of employment in the absence of 
a choice-of-law clause Priestman v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. 782 F. Supp. 681 
(D.Me. 1992); Ferrofluidics Corporation v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc. 
789 F.Supp. 1201 (D.N.H. 1992); D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. 605 
A.2d 252 (N.H.App. 1992); Brazones v. Prothe, 489 N.W. 2d 900 (S.D. 1992), 
Burnside v. Simpson Paper Company 832 P.2d 537 (Wash. App. 1992). 
93 See, e.g., Boyer v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. 391 F.Supp. 471, 472-473 
(D.S.D. 1975); Forney Industries, Inc. v. Andre, 246 F.Supp. 333, 334-335 
(D.N.D. 1965); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corporation, 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-681 
(Tex. 1990); Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 676 (1977). 
94 A violation of a state’s fundamental public policy is most likely to be found 
where choice-of-law clauses are excluded by statutes. See, e.g., Florida Statutes 
§ 685.101 (2) (b); Ohio Revised Code § 2307.39. 
95 314 F.Supp. 2d 1065 (U.S.D.C. Colorado 2004). See also Coleman v. Zenodata 
Corporation, 2004 WL 2202027 (Cal. App.); Davies v. Humble Oil & Refining 
Company, 283 So.2d 783, 786-790 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
28 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 01 
 
 
employee, a Colorado citizen working in Colorado, brought an 
action against his former employer, a Delaware corporation with 
its principle place of business in California, for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The employer 
denied this claim pointing to a Texas choice of law in the 
employment contract and the fact that Texas did not recognize 
any such implied covenants. The United States District Court for 
the District of Colorado, however, struck down the choice-of-law 
clause. It argued that Colorado—the state with the most 
significant relationship to the dispute—recognized an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts. Since this 
was an expression of Colorado’s interest in protecting the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to an employment contract, 
the court held that the application of Texas law would be contrary 
to a fundamental policy of Colorado.96 All in all, it seems, 
therefore, that—today—in a majority of cases conflicts issues 
involving employment contracts are subjected to the law of the 
place of employment. Since this is the rule that prevails in most 
cases under Article 6 (1) of the Rome Convention, again a striking 
convergence in results can be observed. 
iv. Insurance Contracts 
A final type of contract that is afforded special treatment under 
both European and American choice of law are insurance 
contracts. Under both regimes the parties’ freedom to choose the 
applicable law is limited where small business and consumer risks 
are involved. In Europe, this follows from a complex—and at times 
inconsistent—interplay of different provisions whose application 
depend on the type and the location of the risk insured: First, if the 
contract is for non-life insurance and the risk is located in the 
European Community Articles 7 and 8 of Directive 88/35797 
                                            
96 Id. at 1067-1068. 
97 Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 22 June 1988 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance 
other than life assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective 
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provide for application of the law at the policyholder’s habitual 
residence. A free choice of law will only be honored in exceptional 
cases,98 most importantly where the law of the policyholder’s 
habitual residence grants party autonomy or where the contract is 
for the insurance of large risks.99 Second, if the contract is for life 
insurance and the risk is located in the European Community 
Article 32 of Directive 2002/83100 provides for application of the 
law at the policyholder’s habitual residence.101 However, the 
parties may choose another law if the law at the policyholder’s 
habitual residence allows them to do so or where the policyholder 
is a natural person that has his or her habitual residence in a 
member state other than that of which he or she is a national. In 
the latter case the parties may additionally choose the law of the 
member state of which the policyholder is a national. Third, if the 
risk is situated outside the territories of the European 
Community,102 Article 5 of the Rome Convention affords 
protection to policyholders that qualify as consumers. A free 
choice of law in accordance with Article 3 is only allowed where 
Article 5 is not applicable.103 The bottom line of this confusing 
                                                                                                                
exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 73/239/EEC, 
1988 O.J. (L 172) 1 (as amended). 
98 See Article 7 (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Directive 88/357/EEC, supra note 97. 
99 This exception does not gain much importance in the context of small 
business and consumer risks since these are hardly ever classified as large risks. 
Compare the list of large risks in Article 5 (d) of the First Council Directive 
73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business 
of direct insurance other than life assurance, 1973 O.J. (L 228) 3 (as amended). 
100 Directive 2002/83/EEC of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 
November, 2002 concerning life assurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1 (consolidated 
version). 
101 Article 32 refers to the „law of the member state of the commitment” which 
is defined in Article 1 (1) (g) as the law of the member state where the 
policyholder has his or her habitual residence. 
102 Other risks are excluded from the Rome Convention according to Article 1 (3) 
because they are covered by the aforementioned Directives.  
103 If the risk is located outside the European Community but the insurer is 
established within, the national rules of the member states determine the 
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conglomerate of provisions is not easy to draw. However, by and 
large one may say the European regime subjects small business 
and consumer risks in most cases to the law of the state where the 
risk is located, i.e. the law of the policyholder’s habitual residence. 
Freedom to choose the applicable law is granted only in 
exceptional circumstances.  
In the United States, the situation of free choice of law in 
insurance contracts looks rather similar. This holds true even 
though both the Restatement (Second) and the UCC do not 
contain provisions specifically with free choice of law in insurance 
contracts. However, choice-of-law clauses in such contracts are 
often invalidated by means of the fundamental public policy 
doctrine previously explored. The commentary to Restatement 
(Second) § 187 (2) (b) even states that “statutes involving the rights 
of an individual insured as against an insurance company” are 
good examples for statutes which embody a fundamental public 
policy.104 And the commentary to Restatement (Second) § 193 goes 
on: “Effect will frequently not be given to a choice-of-law 
provision in a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance which 
designates a state whose local law gives the insured less protection 
than he would receive under the otherwise applicable law”.105 
Against this background American courts have long invalidated 
choice of law clauses in insurance contracts between individuals 
and insurance companies. They have done so mostly in cases 
where the choice-of-law clause would have deprived the 
policyholder of the protection afforded to him under the law of his 
or her habitual residence because this would be the law otherwise 
applicable under Restatement (Second) § 193. In Param Petroleum 
Corporation v. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co.,106 for example, 
the court invalidated a New York choice-of-law clause in an 
                                                                                                                
applicable law. Since the latter case is rather the exception in the context of 
small business and consumer risks they are not treated in this article. 
104 Restatement (Second) § 187, cmt. g). 
105 Restatement (Second) § 193, cmt. e). 
106 686 A.2d. 377 (N.J. App. 1997). 
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insurance contract insuring the New Jersey operations of a New 
Jersey policyholder. The court ignored the choice-of-law clause 
because it violated the interests of New Jersey, the state where the 
insured risk was located and whose law would have been 
applicable in the absence of a choice-of-law clause. The court 
essentially argued that when dealing with risks located wholly 
within one state the parties to the insurance contract should not 
be permitted to negotiate away the protection of that state’s law, 
“protection which is intended for the insured, the insurance 
company, and for those who may suffer damages as a result of an 
insured risk”.107 Whether this line of cases means that free choice 
of law in insurance contracts is rather the exception than the rule 
in the United States is difficult to tell. But one can definitely say 
that American policyholders—just like European policyholders—
are likely to be afforded the protection of the state of their habitual 
residence. 
III. THE TREND OF CONVERGENCE: AN ECONOMIC 
EXPLANATION 
The previous discussion has proved that the American and the 
European concept of party autonomy in international law are not 
as far apart as commonly assumed. The basic approach is fairly 
similar and leads to similar practical results. In the following part, 
I endeavor to explain this finding with the help of economic 
theory. More specifically, I analyze the main features of the 
American and European approach to party autonomy under the 
notion of economic efficiency. I address two basic questions: First, 
is there an economic rationale for granting free party choice of 
law? Second, can the limitations of the free party choice of law be 
justified on economic grounds? However, before going into the 
details one caveat needs to be made: The following discussion 
cannot provide a comprehensive account of the economic costs 
and benefits of party autonomy and its limitations. More 
                                            
107 Id. at 381. 
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specifically, it cannot account for the fact that the granting and 
limiting of party autonomy is largely a matter of national—or 
regional—law and as such subject to strategic interactions within 
and between states.108 The following discussion, therefore, does not 
account for public choice and interest group considerations109 but 
determines the economic costs and benefits of free choice of law 
from the perspective of a single benevolent and well-informed 
global legislator that aims for global welfare. Even though this 
approach is simplistic, it provides economic insights into the 
development of contracts conflict during the last years. 
A. THE SUPREMACY OF PARTY AUTONOMY AS VICTORY OF 
EFFICIENCY 
From an economic point of view the supremacy of free choice of 
law in both Europe and the United States is by no means 
surprising. In fact, there is general agreement in the economic 
community that granting the parties the freedom to choose the 
applicable law is—in principle—an efficient approach to the 
choice-of-law problem.110 The basis for this proposition is that 
                                            
108 See for a discussion of different “models” that can be applied in the economic 
analysis of private international law Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, Three 
Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law – Cross-Border Torts 
as Example, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 
(Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006).  
109 See for a public choice analysis of conflict of laws Erin A. O’ Hara, 
Economics, Public Choice and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L. J. 941 
(2002) [hereinafter O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice and Conflict of Laws]; 
Erin A. O’Hara, Opting out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of 
Contractual Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551 (2000) [hereinafter O’Hara, 
Opting out of Regulation]; Ribstein, supra note 40, at 274-281. 
110 See, e.g., Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Regulatory Competition: A Private 
International Law Approach, 8 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 251 (1999); Andrew T. 
Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L. J. 883, 913-915 (2002); 
Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A 
Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 386-387 (2003); Erin A. 
O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000) [hereinafter O’Hara & Ribstein, From Politics to 
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individuals are assumed to be rational maximizers of their own 
welfare and have idiosyncratic knowledge about their preferences 
unavailable to anybody else. Therefore, they do not enter a choice-
of-law agreement unless they believe that it will make them better 
off. The reasons why parties think that they will be better off with 
a choice of law can be manifold: They might select a foreign law 
because it is better tailored to their needs than the otherwise 
applicable law. The chosen law, for example, might have an 
established body of case law that facilitates interpretation of legal 
rules and thereby avoids future disputes. Or the parties might just 
want to select a neutral law different from that of their respective 
domestic laws. However, no matter what the reasons for the 
choice are as long as the parties agree on the applicable law and as 
long the choice does not reduce the welfare of third parties it will 
lead to Pareto efficiency.111 It will foster Kaldor-Hicks efficiency if 
it does not reduce the welfare of third parties more than it 
increases the welfare of the parties to the choice-of-law 
agreement.112 All in all, party autonomy and free choice of law, 
thus, stand on firm economic grounds.  
                                                                                                                
Efficiency in Choice of Law]; Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of 
Laws and Choice of Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, VOLUME 5 
631 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) [hereinafter O’Hara & 
Ribstein, Conflict of Laws and Choice of Law]; Francesco Parisi & Larry E. 
Ribstein, Choice of Law, in THE PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 
VOLUME 1 236 (Peter Newman ed. 1998); Ribstein, supra note 40; Ribstein, 
supra note 27; Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Katrin Lantermann, Choice of Law from 
an Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 108, at 86; MICHAEL WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, 
POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 38-42 (2001); Woodward, 
supra note 51. 
111 See for a critical discussion of the presumption of efficiency of contracts 
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient? 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980). 
112 See for a detailed description of the economic benefits of party autonomy 
Guzman, supra note 110, at 913-15; O’Hara & Ribstein, From Politics to 
Efficiency in Choice of Law, supra note 110, at 1186-187; Ribstein, supra 
note 40, at 390-412; Ribstein, supra note 27, at 247-55.  
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B. THE LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY AS EXPRESSION OF 
MARKET FAILURE 
If the dominance of party choice of law in both the United States 
and Europe can be explained with the help of economic theory the 
question arises whether the same holds true for its limitations. As 
a matter of principle, economic theory suggests that free party 
choice of law should only be limited in cases of market failure. In 
the following I, therefore, analyze whether the existing limitations 
in both European and American choice of law can be classified as 
strategies to secure efficiency where the market in and of itself 
does not do so. The discussion focuses on two generally recognized 
sources of market failure, which promise the most fruitful insights 
in this context: First, externalities and third party effects, and 
second, opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry. 
1. EXTERNALITIES AND THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS 
The first source of market failure that merits closer analysis here 
relates to externalities and the presence of negative third party 
effects. Both occur where the parties to an exchange do not bear all 
the costs associated with a transaction but impose costs on other 
parties or the society at large.113 In the context of party autonomy 
costs of this kind may arise where the parties choose a law other 
than the lex fori. This is because such a choice increases litigation 
costs since it requires application of legal rules that are unknown 
to local courts and, therefore, usually more difficult to ascertain 
and apply. However, the mere fact that a party choice of law 
increases litigation costs does not mean that the choice produces 
negative third party effects. In fact, this is only the case if the 
parties to the choice-of-law agreement do not bear the additional 
costs involved, i.e. if they do not internalize the additional costs. 
This, in turn, depends on how the applicable law is determined 
                                            
113 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44-46 (4th ed. 2004); 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-46 (3th 2003); HANS-BERND 
SCHÄFER & CLAUS OTT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL LAW 95 (2004). 
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and who has to pay for it. Essentially two systems can be 
distinguished in this context: According to the first one—
dominant in England and the United States—the applicable law is 
considered as a fact that has to be argued and proven by the 
parties.114 Therefore, the parties bear the costs of researching and 
presenting the applicable legal rules. According to the second 
model—in place in continental Europe, notably in Germany—the 
applicable law has to be determined by the courts ex officio.115 The 
parties to the choice-of-law agreement, however, have to pay for 
the determination of the applicable law as part of the court fees. 
Under both the Anglo-American and the continental European 
system the parties, therefore, bear the increased costs of choosing 
a law other than the lex fori.116 
For the concept of party autonomy under American and European 
law this finding has essentially two implications: First of all, it 
demonstrates that the concept of externalities does not provide a 
                                            
114 PETER NORTH & J. J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH’S PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-105 (14th ed. 1999); SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 1, § 12.15, at 543-46. 
115 See, e.g., BGH, June 23, 2003, 56 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 
2685, 2686 (2003); BGH, Sept. 19, 2001, 55 NJW 1209 (2002); BGH, Dec. 15, 
1986, 41 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 273, 274-75 (1987); BGH, Mar. 30, 
1976, 39 NJW 1581, 1583 (1976); BGH, June 23, 1964, 27 NJW 2012 (1964); 
Reinhard Greger & Reinhold Geimer, in ZÖLLER, KOMMENTAR ZUR 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 293, no. 1 (25th ed. 2005); Peter Hartmann, in 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 293, no. 6 (Adolf Baumbach et al. eds., 63rd ed. 2005); 
Dieter Leipold, in STEIN & JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 
§ 293, no. 31 (Reinhard Bork et al. eds., 21th ed. 1997); Hanns Prütting, in 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 293, no. 2 and 47 
(Gerhard Lüke & Peter Wax eds., 2nd ed. 2000). 
116 Unfortunately, it seems that court fees in Germany do not mirror the actual 
costs of determining the applicable law. But even if this is so, economic theory 
does not suggest a limitation of the parties’ freedom to choose. Rather, it 
suggests a modification of the rules on the reimbursement of courts for the 
determination of the applicable law. See Giesela Rühl, Die Kosten der 
Rechtswahlfreiheit: Zur Anwendung ausländischen Rechts durch deutsche 
Gerichte, 71 RABELSZ (2007) (forthcoming). See also Parisi & Ribstein, supra 
note 110, at 239. 
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rationale for any of the above discussed limitations. More 
specifically, it does not provide a rationale for limiting the parties’ 
choice of law in purely domestic cases and for excluding the 
choice of both unrelated and non-state law:117 Since the parties 
internalize the additional litigation costs associated with the 
choice of law in these instances there are no negative third party 
effects that might interfere with the presumed efficiency of 
choice-of-law clauses. Second, the above finding also suggests that 
recent judicial and legislative trends in the private international 
law of contracts can be explained with the help of economic 
theory. This holds true for the fact that few choice-of-law clauses 
are actually struck down by the courts for want of a connection to 
a foreign legal system or for want of a substantial relationship to 
the chosen law. But it also holds true for the legislative 
abandonment of the substantial relationship requirement as well 
as the increasing openness towards the choice of non-state laws on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Economic theory can even explain that 
the recognition of non-state law has started with bodies of laws, 
such as the UNIDROIT Principles, the Principles of European 
Contracts Law and the Uniform Customs and Practices of the 
International Chamber of Commerce: All three sets of rules share 
the virtue of containing a set of written rules sufficiently defined 
and thus relatively easy to ascertain. Therefore, the increase in 
litigation costs is moderate. At least it does not substantially differ 
from the increase associated with the choice of a foreign state law 
which is permitted under both European and American law. It 
needs to be stressed, however, that economic theory does not 
require the non-state body of law to be sufficiently codified: As 
long as the parties internalize the costs associated with the choice 
of a non-state body of law—regardless of how indeterminate and 
imprecise it is—the choice will be efficient. 
                                            
117 See also Ribstein, supra note 40, at 263 (arguing for the choice of an unrelated 
law); Gerhard Wagner, The Virtues of Diversity in European Private Law, in Jan 
Smits (ed.), The Need for a European Contract Law 3, 14-15 (2005) (arguing for 
free choice of law in domestic cases). 
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2. OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
The second source of market failure that promises helpful insights 
into the limitations of party autonomy under American and 
European law revolves around opportunistic behavior. Such 
behavior occurs where one party to a contract takes advantage of 
his superior knowledge, in order to further his interests, by failing 
to disclose such information to the other party.118 In the context of 
choice of law this kind of behavior may be found where one party 
knows more about the applicable law than the other. This is often 
the case in consumer, employment and insurance contracts: Since 
the consumer’s, employee’s or policyholder’s contracting partners 
engage in the same kind of transaction on a day-to-day basis they 
have a cost-justified incentive to learn the content of alternative 
laws and to select the law that is most congenial to their interests. 
The occasionally contracting consumer, employee or policyholder, 
in contrast, faces severe informational costs and, therefore, often 
foregoes the acquisition of valuable information.119 Under certain 
circumstances, namely where the consumer, the employer or the 
policyholders are not able to distinguish different quality levels ex 
ante, most importantly the level of protection offered under the 
chosen law, this might lead to a race to the bottom, i.e. the choice 
of the law with the lowest level of protection. In the worst case, 
this downward development leads to a market for lemons, i.e. a 
market for inefficient choice-of-law clauses which might induce a 
complete break-down of the market.120 
Some economists have argued that such a downward development 
is not likely going to take place in consumer and insurance 
                                            
118 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 113, at 47-48; HARRISON, supra note 113; 
SCHÄFER & OTT, supra note 113, at 94. 
119 See also Wulf-Henning Roth, Grundfragen im künftigen internationalen 
Verbrauchervertragsrecht der Gemeinschaft, in Privatrecht in Europa – Vielfalt, 
Kollision, Kooperation 591, 607-611 (Michael Coester et al. eds., (2004). 
120 See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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markets.121 Firms would not risk their reputation by choosing a 
law that decreased the other parties’ legal position. Consumers, 
employees, and policyholders had cheap access to many sources of 
consumer-oriented information about firms including third-party 
rating services, magazines and the internet. Therefore, they could 
confine their dealings to reputable merchants or demand 
significant discounts when dealing with merchants who lacked a 
strong reputation. However, these arguments do not hold true for 
all kinds of transactions and markets because they are based on 
strong assumptions about firm and individual behavior. For 
example, they assume that consumers, employees and 
policyholders can determine the quality level of different laws 
before contract formation. This, however, does not necessarily 
hold true especially in regard to the applicable law. By the same 
token, the arguments assume the consumer’s, employee’s and 
policyholder’s willingness to invest in the gathering of 
information about the contracting party and the applicable law. 
Yet, this assumption depends on whether the expected gains from 
doing so outweigh the costs involved in the information gathering 
process. In most transactions the latter will by far exceed the 
expected gains and thus make the rational consumer abstain from 
any investigation into the content of the applicable law.122 More 
important, however, is that the above arguments cannot strike 
with full force under the special conditions of international 
transactions: First, a company engaging in cross-border sales is a 
lot less likely to lose or to develop a reputation than a company 
engaging in one country only. The potential customers are too 
                                            
121 Parisi & Ribstein, supra note 110, at 239-40; Ribstein, supra note 27, at 409-
11. See also Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An 
Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 503, 508-509 (1987) (arguing for free choice 
of law in product liability cases). 
122 See also Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory: One more 
Trip to the Choice-of-Law Well, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759, 811 and Gary T. 
Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 938-41 (1996) (both arguing that for reasons of asymmetric 
information a free choice of law in product liability cases will rather provoke a 
“race to the bottom” than a “race to the top”). 
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dispersed to interact and to exchange information about the firm’s 
performance. Additionally, consumer associations are less 
organized on an international level and thus less effective in 
exercising their monitoring function. The firm, therefore, does not 
run a major risk when submitting the contract to the law of state 
that shifts as many risks to the consumer, employee, or 
policyholder as possible. For the same reason it is more difficult 
for firms to build up reputation that might induce the other party 
to pay a higher price for the same product but a better law.  
Against this background, limitations on party autonomy in respect 
to consumer, employment and insurance contracts can be 
rationalized with the concepts of opportunistic behavior and 
information asymmetry. But the usefulness of the two concepts 
goes even further: They provide some economic underpinning for 
the application of the law of the consumer’s or policyholder’s 
habitual residence and the employee’s place of work. Two facts 
support this view. First, the informational asymmetry between 
consumers, employees and policyholders on the one hand and 
professionals on the other hand is a lot less severe if the law of the 
consumer’s or policyholder’s habitual residence or the employee’s 
place of work applies. Consumers, employees and policyholders 
know the laws at their habitual residence or place of work better 
than any foreign law. At least they have easier and less costly 
access to the related information which, in turn, decreases the 
extent of information asymmetry and increases the chances of an 
informed decision to contract. Second, and more importantly, 
professionals can account for different legal rules and shoulder the 
associated information costs much better than consumers, 
policyholders or employees. Since they are likely to engage in 
numerous transactions of the same kind they can gather 
information about the applicable law more cheaply and apportion 
the costs to a large number of contracts. In short: Compared to 
consumers, policyholders and employees, professionals are the 
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cheapest cost-avoider.123 The risk of opportunistic behavior and 
information asymmetry, therefore, can explain both the fact that 
American and European law limit party autonomy in consumer, 
employment and insurance contracts and the fact that they favor 
application of the law at the consumer’s or policyholder’s habitual 
residence and the employee’s place of work. 
In contrast, the two concepts cannot be invoked to explain other 
limitations on party autonomy. This is because in transactions 
between commercial entities the parties are usually in a position 
to obtain the relevant information or to bargain for a lower price. 
As a result, there is no reason to limit choice of law in purely 
domestic transactions as does Article 3 (3) of the Rome 
Convention and Restatement (Second) § 187.124 Just as well, there 
is no economic reason to limit party autonomy to the choice of a 
related or connected law. The most recent developments in the 
field, most importantly the case law lowering the requirements for 
a connection to a foreign jurisdiction or the chosen law just as 
well as the most recent legislative enactments in the United 
States, support this finding. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The principle of party autonomy is a popular topic in the private 
international law of contracts. It has been the focus of numerous 
law review articles both in Europe and the United States. With the 
foregoing article I have made two contributions to the field: first, I 
have demonstrated that American and European conflicts law 
have moved closer over the last couple of years when it comes to 
the granting and the design of party autonomy. More specifically, I 
have argued that American and European law do not only allow 
parties to choose the applicable law but also restrict the freedom 
of choice in the same situations and in similar ways. Second, I 
                                            
123 See also Roth, supra note 119, 607-611 (2004). 
124 See also Wagner, supra note 117, at 14-15. 
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have illustrated that the trend of convergence in the context of 
party autonomy can be explained with the help of economic 
theory. I have reasoned that the principle of party autonomy is an 
efficient approach in the private international law of contracts and 
that limitations to party autonomy, especially those in consumer, 
insurance and employment contracts can be explained with the 
presence of market failure, most importantly opportunistic 
behavior and information asymmetry. On the other hand, I have 
demonstrated that other limitations to party autonomy, such as 
the limitation of the parties’ choice to state laws and related laws, 
have no apparent economic underpinning, and that their recent—
or soon to be expected—abandonment finds support in economic 
theory. 
Of course, this contribution could not provide more than a first 
insight into the comparative and economic analysis of party 
autonomy. Further research will be necessary to fully understand 
the trend of convergence as well as its relation to economic 
theory. More specifically, further research will be required to 
determine “why” and “how” American and European law are 
moving closer and whether this development is actually desirable. 
With this article I just hope to have shown that comparative 
analysis and economic theory—as well as the combination of the 
two—can improve and broaden our understanding of private 
international law. At the same time I hope to have contributed a 
small piece to the emerging debate on the Law & Economics of 
choice of law—a debate which has only recently gained 
momentum but which promises fruitful insights into the field that 
has been shaped by Arthur von Mehren during the last half 
century. 
